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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, the rising divergence in sectoral wage moderation within European Monetary 
Union (EMU) member states since the introduction of the Euro is examined.  During the 
1980s  and  1990s,  wage  restraint  cycles  between  exposed,  manufacturing  sectors,  and 
sheltered, private services sectors within EMU candidate-countries were highly synchronous, 
and differences in wage inflation between sectors within countries was low.  After 1996, 
significant divergence in sectoral wage inflation emerged, and synchronicity of wage restraint 
cycles between sectors collapsed after 1999.  This paper will address the question of why 
divergence occurred between sectoral wage restraint within EMU countries after 1996.  It will 
be argued that monetary union’s removal of national exchange rate pegs and inflation criteria, 
and the central banks that enforced them, accentuated wage preference divergence between 
actors in the exposed and sheltered sectors, enabling unions in sheltered sectors to push for 
high  wage  increases  while  unions  in  more  exposed  sectors  had  to  continue  with  wage 
moderation due to competitiveness constraints.  Unlike some political science literature that 
assumes powerful, protected sectors produce excessive wage inflation at the expense of the 
exposed sector, it will be argued that the European Monetary System’s fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, and more importantly the Maastricht inflation criteria, provided an effective 
monetary  constraint  on  sheltered  sector  wage  growth,  keeping  sheltered  sector  wage 
moderation in line with wage restraint developments in the exposed sector in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.   
 
                                                 
1 This is a rough, first draft of a thesis chapter, and includes only descriptive statistics.  In the final version I plan 
on utilising a panel regression approach for 15 countries (10 EMU countries and 5 non-EMU countries), between 
1979 and 2005, examining the impact of currency regimes on the difference in wage restraint between the 
manufacturing and public sector.  Any suggestions for time variant proxy variables or categorical variables that 
embody different currency regimes (i.e. hard peg, soft peg, monetary union, floating exchange rate, inflation 
targeting, etc.) are most welcome.  
2 Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of Economics.  Correspondence: a.l.johnston@lse.ac.uk  Johnston 
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Much attention has been paid to the influence of labour market institutions on macroeconomic 
performance.  Assessed largely along the lines of union centralisation and coordination, wage 
bargaining institutions’ impact on inflation and unemployment has been dissected in great 
detail by not only economists, but also by political scientists.  Economies where unions are 
highly coordinated or centralised, these scholars claim, should witness a greater exertion of 
wage  restraint  by  wage  setting  actors  than  countries  with  lower  levels  of  union 
coordination/centralisation.  (Wage restraint is defined here as nominal wage growth minus 
labour  productivity  growth;  positive  values  indicate  wage  excess,  and  lower  or  negative 
values indicate wage restraint
3).  The Olsonian logic behind this argument is that organised 
interests would internalise their actions once they become so encompassing that the pursuit of 
their interests would cause major disruptions to the wider economy.  Most, if not all, scholars 
examining labour market institutions’ influence on macroeconomic performance, however, 
assumed similar union preferences – that is, unions in all parts of the economy had the same 
utility  function  regarding  real  wages  and  unemployment,  regardless  of  their  sector  or 
employer.   
Yet, in the 1990s, the emergence of sectoral union analysis questioned this assumption 
of similar preferences across all union actors (see Crouch, 1990 and Garrett and Way, 1999 
for a more comprehensive argument).  These scholars argued that union preferences were not 
similarly  aligned  for  all  sectors;  rather,  some  sectors  would  place  greater  weight  on 
competitive wage developments, and therefore wage restraint, than others.  Unions with high 
membership in sectors exposed to international trade, it was maintained, should have higher 
wage sensitivity to competitive developments than unions in the public and more sheltered 
sectors.  Firms in industries with high exposure to foreign competition would not have the 
                                                 
3  Because wage restraint performance between sectors within countries is compared, it is unimportant if real or 
nominal wage restraint is used (as all sectors in one country face the same price level.   
 Johnston 
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same manoeuvrability to raise product prices even if labour costs increased.  Instead, firms 
would prefer to fire workers rather than allow prices to rise and risk substantial losses in 
competitiveness and market share.  Thus, unions with high membership in tradable goods 
sectors should have greater incentive to pursue wage moderation, in order to guarantee higher 
employment and higher export demand.  Such incentives for wage restraint, however, are not 
shared by unions in sectors that are more sheltered from international competition, which 
have more secure jobs.  In theory, these unions have greater room to push for high wage 
increases, because their employers are less exposed to competition, and therefore have greater 
leeway in increasing prices should labour costs increase.  These divergent wage preferences 
could  lead  to  inter-union  tensions  as  well  as  poor  macroeconomic  performance,  if  wage 
excess in more sheltered sectors was not compensated for by heavy wage restraint in more 
exposed sectors.  Theory on sectoral wage preference shifted the traditional class-conflict 
analysis in wage bargaining literature away from capital versus labour and towards (exposed) 
labour versus (sheltered) labour. 
Despite the convincing “sectoral divergence” argument put forth by scholars analysing 
sectoral wage preference, empirical facts do not fit the theory, at least for a high majority of 
European Monetary Union (EMU) candidate countries.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
differences  in  exposed,  manufacturing  and  sheltered,  services  wage  inflation
4,  within 
countries, was actually quite low for the EMU10 (Greece and Luxembourg excluded).  Only 
in the one to two years prior to 1999, did a rise in sectoral wage restraint divergence within 
these  countries  begin  to  emerge.    Unlike  the  1980s,  where  differentials  in  sectoral  wage 
excess within countries were low, under EMU such differentials significantly widened, as the 
                                                 
4 The words wage excess, wage inflation and wage restraint will be used interchangeable throughout this paper.  
Wage  excess  and  wage  inflation  are  both  defined  as  the  difference  in  nominal  wage  growth  and  labour 
productivity growth.  Though wage restraint is technically the inverse of this measurement, it will be calculated 
the same way. Johnston 
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manufacturing  sector  continued  to  exert  significant  wage  restraint,  while  private  services 
sectors ceased to improve their wage restraint performance (see Figure 1 and 2).   
These empirics present a puzzle.   Why do EMU countries not fit the sectoral wage 
preference  divergence  theory  for  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  when,  if  anything,  sectoral 
divergence should be most relevant?  Before the creation of the Single Market, sheltered 
sector unions were especially protected from competitive pressures, and had much greater 
bargaining power than they did in the late 1990s and 2000s.  The following puzzle will be 
addressed in this paper: why did it take until 1996/7 for wage restraint outcomes between the 
exposed,  manufacturing  and  sheltered,  private  services  sectors  within  EMU  candidate 
countries to diverge by such a significant degree?   
Figure 1: Difference in Sectoral Wage Inflation (Hourly Wage Growth Minus Productivity 
Growth) for the EMU10: 1979-1989, 1992-1998, and 1999-2005 Period Averages
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It  will  be  argued  that  the  literature  examining  sectoral  union  interests  neglects  an 
important  “capitalist”  actor,  which  can  suppress  inter-union  wage  conflict:  non-
accommodating central banks.  The original capital-labour class conflict must be revisited.  
                                                 
5 Difference in means tests confirm that the 1999-2005 period average is significantly different from the other 
two period averages on a 95% confidence interval. Johnston 
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The European Monetary System (EMS), EMU’s precursor, established a system of credible 
exchange rate pegs that suppressed the sheltered sectors’ ability to push for excessive wages.  
With the Bundesbank (a central bank whose prime concern was price stability) as the anchor 
of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), central banks of EU member-states that 
joined the fixed exchange rate arrangement, de facto adopted a German monetary policy.  
Once countries entered an exchange rate arrangement with Germany, national central banks 
had to ensure that national inflation rates were not significantly higher than Germany’s, as 
this would threaten the peg’s sustainability.  If national wage growth was significantly higher 
than German wage growth, central banks would have to respond to wage setters via monetary 
tightening (for a more formal model, see Hochreiter and Winckler, 1995).  “Responsible” 
aggregate wage setting, therefore, could be conducted by wage setters in two ways: 1) wage 
setters in all sectors could cooperate by exerting wage restraint, or 2) wage setters in one 
sector (usually the exposed sector) could exert significant wage restraint to offset wage excess 
in other sectors.  In the 1980s, nominal wage inflation in both the exposed, manufacturing and 
sheltered, private services sectors within EMU member-states was relatively high.  That one 
sector would be able or willing to take on a significant deflationary role rendered the second 
option above unlikely.  Hence, throughout the 1980s, both sectoral wage setters within EMU 
countries constrained their wages, and sectoral wage-restraint convergence resulted.   
By the mid-1990s, however, wage growth in both sectors had been reined in to such 
an extent that the sheltered, private services sectors could afford to halt restraint, as long as 
the manufacturing sector continued to increase wage moderation, which they more or less did, 
due to increased globalisation pressures.  EMU’s removal of national exchange rate pegs and 
the  central  banks  that  enforced  them,  as  well  as  the  strict  Maastricht  inflation  criteria, 
produced  very  different  incentives  for  wage  actors  in  the  exposed  and  sheltered  sector, 
leading to the rise in divergence.  Pursuit of wage restraint ceased in sheltered sectors with the Johnston 
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removal of Maastricht’s inflation criteria and the EMS’s exchange rate arrangements.  After 
1999, these gains in wage restraint were then reversed, quite significantly, by some countries’ 
sheltered sectors (notably in Finland, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands). 
The first section of this paper provides a brief review of the literature.  In section II 
measurements  and  methodologies  are  described.    In  sections  III  and  IV  the  sectoral 
divergence puzzle within EMU member-states is explained.  In these two sections, sectoral 
performance  within  ten  EMU  candidates  and  five  non-EMU  countries  (Australia,  Japan, 
Sweden
6,  the  UK
7  and  the  US,  hereafter  called  the  non-ERM5)  that  did  not  formally 
participate in the ERM in the 1980s is compared.  Section V concludes by with an outline of 
the consequences of sectoral divergence for the future of EMU and collective bargaining.  If 
sectoral wage preference divergence becomes excessive, to the extent that exposed sector 
wage setters cannot compensate for high sheltered sector wage excess, aggregate inflation 
performance could be jeopardised, as was the case for several EMU countries in the early 
2000s.   
 
I. The Debate on Sectoral Divergence 
Relatively little has been said on sectoral wage restraint performance in the political 
economy  literature,  at  least  until  the  early  1990s.    The  primary  reason  for  this  is  data 
constraints.    Ample  study  has  been    performed  on  national  corporatist  institutions’ 
(specifically  levels  of  centralisation  and  coordination  between  unions)  contribution  to 
macroeconomic performance (see Crouch, 1985; Bean, Layard, and Nickell, 1986; Calmfors 
                                                 
6 Sweden is used as a non-ERM/EMU country because it only formally joined the ERM for 18 months in 
1991/2.  In 1977, the Swedish krona left the currency snake and was pegged to a basket of currencies where the 
dollar had double weight in relation to the trade exchange.  In 1982, the Swedish Riksbank did plan to peg the 
krona directly the Deutschmark, but this was postponed indefinitely.  Since 1992, the krona has operated under a 
floating exchange rate and the Riksbank has pursued an inflation targeting policy of 2% per year, with a tolerated 
deviation of ±1% (Öberg, 2006).        
7 The UK is also included in the non-ERM/EMU category due to its relatively short exposure to the ERM.  
Britain joined the ERM and pegged its currency to the Deutschmark in October, 1990, but later abandoned this 
peg in September, 1992 (McNamara, 1998: 21).   Johnston 
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& Driffill, 1988; Soskice, 1990; Wallerstein, 1990 and; Golden, 1993 among many others).  
However, until the 1990s, most analyses examining macroeconomic performance and wage 
bargaining were restricted to national level institutions, assuming that the utility functions of 
all unions, regardless of their sectoral affiliation, are the same.   
Several scholars in political economy have broken away from this mould, however, 
and have discussed the macroeconomic implications of divergent wage preferences for wage 
setters  in  different  sectors.    Crouch  (1990),  one  of  the  first  to  examine  wage  bargaining 
interests along sectoral lines, hypothesised that wage setters in the exposed sectors are more 
concerned with problems of international competitiveness than wage setters in the protected 
sector.  As a result, if a trade union movement is dominated by industrial unions in the export 
sector,  “foreign-trade-conscious  behaviour”  should  characterise  the  movement  as  a  whole 
(Crouch, 1990; 70).  Even though he is one of the first to argue divergent sectoral interests in 
political economy, his analysis lacks detailed sectoral level data, which limits his ability to 
test his hypothesis.  He concludes that “while the number of cases is too small and the number 
of independent variables is too large to permit drawing any subtle conclusions, the discussion 
[of sectoral wage interests] has shown that exposed-sector unionism is a relevant variable, 
justifying further research” (Crouch, 1990; 83).  Crouch establishes a logical theory, but he 
does  not  rigorously  test  it  empirically,  and  rather  uses  several  country  case  examples  to 
determine whether his argument could be a valid one.         
While  Crouch  provides  neither  a  formal  model  nor  econometric  testing  of  his 
hypothesis, other scholars have tested his sectoral hypothesis on aggregate macroeconomic 
indicators.    One  of  the  most  comprehensive  political  arguments  for  sectoral  preference 
divergence  is  that  advocated  by  Garrett  and  Way  (1999).    The  authors  examine  power Johnston 
 
8 
dynamics between public sector unions
8 and exposed, private sector unions, and conclude that 
the  growth  of  public  sector  unions  is  one  important  reason  for  the  apparent  economic 
problems of strong labour regimes.  They argue that in countries where public sector unions 
become  extremely  strong,  as  was  the  case  in  the  Scandinavian  countries  in  the  1990s, 
powerful  labour  confederations  cannot  stop  public  sector  workers  from  using  their 
organisational power to bid up their wages to levels that have significant repercussions on the 
exposed sector.  Garrett and Way provide an econometric model to test the impact of public 
sector union strength on aggregate inflation and unemployment, yet their study suffers from a 
similar caveat as that of Crouch: they lack detailed, sector-level wage and productivity growth 
data to test their argument.  Moreover, the authors control for central bank independence in 
their analysis, yet they do not adequately take into account central banks’ commitments to 
fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  or  inflation  rules  across  the  countries  they  study.  Only  four 
countries in their OECD13 sample had shadowed the Deutschmark under the ERM.
9   
The  recently  released  EU  KLEMS  Database  provides  a  rich  dataset  of  worker 
compensation and productivity by International Standard Industrial Classification.  With data 
from 1970 to 2005, it offers the ability to test the exposed/sheltered sector dynamic with 
sectoral level data.  Interestingly enough, though Crouch’s and Garret and Way’s argument 
appears quite sound, it only partially fits the facts.  While it provides a good explanation for 
high sectoral wage restraint divergence in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it does little to 
                                                 
8 Though the Garrett and Way examine public sector unions, who in theory should be relatively irresponsible to 
monetary threats (see Franzese, 2001), rather than sheltered, private sector unions, who are responsive to 
monetary threats, their exposed/sheltered argument holds similar logic for both sectors. 
9  Garrett and Way rely upon the Cukierman (1992) legal index of central bank independence, yet this index 
provides a number of problems in terms of assigning proper weights to countries within exchange rate regimes.  
First of all, the central bank’s policy objective is assigned a weight of 15% in the overall index, and this variable 
is highly focused around price stability rather than fulfilling an exchange rate peg.  In the definition of priority 
assignment to price stability, “first priority assigned to price stability” receives a coding of 1, while “first priority 
assigned to a fixed exchange rate” receives a coding of 0.66.  No detail is given to the anchor currency which the 
peg revolves around.  Thus, if the country in question fixes its exchange rate with the Deutschmark, and thus 
indirectly  adopts  a  monetary  policy  which  places  a  high  emphasis  on  price  stability  via  shadowing  the 
Bundesbank, it will be assigned a lower score than a country whose first priority is price stability, albeit to a less 
extent than the Bundesbank.   
 Johnston 
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explain the ERM period (1979 to the mid-1990s).  Put otherwise, divergent wage preferences 
fit the data well for the EMU10 after 1996/7; it does not fit the data  before this period.  
During the 1980s and early to mid 1990s, wage excess in both the exposed, manufacturing 
sector as well as the sheltered, private services sector was high, and both sectors complied 
with increasing wage restraint.  Given that the protected sector was arguably more sheltered 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is even more paradoxical that the data suggest that wage 
restraint differentials between private services and manufacturing was so low for the EMU10 
countries during these periods.  With the enactment of the Single Market in the 1990s, one 
would expect that unions within these sectors would come under increasing strain to maintain 
competitive wages.   
Both arguments neglect an important interaction between wage setters and monetary 
authorities,  especially  monetary  authorities  under  pressure  to  uphold  fixed  exchange  rate 
arrangements.  Franzese (2001) provides an analysis of wage-bargaining’s interaction with 
monetary policy, using a similar dual-economy approach.  He concludes that, for countries 
where coordinated bargaining is led by the traded-sector, central bank independence is most 
effective at reducing wage inflation.  Wage growth in the sheltered, private sector can be kept 
at bay under an independent central bank.  He argues that if the non-traded sector pushes for 
excessive  wage  increases,  the  central  bank  with  respond  with  monetary  tightening  and 
increased interest rates.  Higher interest rates reduce investment, and so hurt employers and 
workers in sectors that are highly dependent on domestic demand (private, sheltered sectors, 
but NOT necessarily public sectors, which may remain unharmed from decreases in private 
demand).  Yet Franzese’s analysis assumes the existence of national central banks.  Though 
his  analysis  does  a  sufficient  job  of  explaining  wage  developments  in  EMU  candidate 
countries  prior  to  EMU,  it  provides  minimal  explanation  for  developments  that  occurred 
afterwards.   Johnston 
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How then can sectoral divergence in wage restraint under EMU be accounted for?  
Arguments put forth by Garrett & Way (1999) and Crouch (1990) on the one hand,  and 
Franzese  (2001)  on  the  other  will  be  merged  in  this  paper,  and  the  importance  of  fixed 
exchange rate regimes, and their dissolution, on sectoral wage-restraint convergence will be 
discussed.  EMU produced a profound shift in the institutional regime that governs wage 
bargaining, with consequences for its domestic political economies. This led to a wage-setting 
regime in EMU in which wage restraint within countries was considerably less synchronised 
than was the case in the institutional design that the 1980s and 1990s offered.  Under EMU, 
individual trade unions in all sectors within member-states no longer faced the hard monetary 
constraint  imposed  by  their  national  central  bank.  Yet  the  subsequent  possibility  of 
inflationary  wage  explosions  did  not  occur,  because  competitiveness  concerns  kept  wage 
developments in the exposed sector in check.  If wage settlements became too inflationary for 
employers  exposed  to  international  competition,  they  would  be  persuaded  to  shed 
employment rather than increase prices, which  would threaten their market share.  While 
wage  pressures  from  unions  in  the  exposed  sector  are  limited  through  competitiveness 
concerns, unions in the private, sheltered sector by definition do not face such constraints. 
The divergence in wage restraint outcomes that are emerging within EMU member-states 
between wage-setters in export sectors on the one hand, and labour unions in sheltered private 
services on the other, is a logical consequence of these different constraints. Countries where 
the disappearing monetary constraint is not supplanted by hard incentives that tie wage-setting 
in the sheltered and exposed sectors therefore face sectoral divergence, as Crouch and Garrett 
and Way theorised. 
After discussing the methodology used to assess sectoral divergence, a comparison of 
the 1980s, Maastricht and EMU periods (1979-1989, 1992-1998 and 1999-present) will be Johnston 
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made to highlight the institutional shift that has taken place.  Different incentives for exposed 
and sheltered sectors will then be examined 
 
II. Assessing Sectoral Divergence in Wage Restraint: Measurements and Methodology 
 
This  analysis  seeks  to  conceptualise  sectoral  divergence  between  two  sectors  for  10 
ERM/EMU countries (Greece and  Luxembourg excluded): manufacturing, and the private 
services sector.  Manufacturing’s exposure to international competition is quite clear, yet it is 
important  to  emphasise  which  sectors  will  be  selected  for  the  private,  services  sector,  as 
private services have variation in “tradability”.  First off, it is important to pick a sector which 
does not lay predominantly in the public sphere.  Mentioned  above, public sector unions 
should be relatively irresponsive to interest rate changes and monetary tightening, as they are 
sheltered  from  its  adverse  effects  on  private  demand.    Thus,  non-market  services  (public 
administration and defence, education and healthcare) are omitted from this analysis
10.     
  Using data on the French economy, Allard-Prigent et al (2000) examine the tradability 
of French sectors.  The use a more loose definition of tradability, and define the tradable 
sector as an industry whose share of exports and imports in the overall production is above 
10% since 1990.  In other words, if { [(exports + imports)/GDP] / 2* value added } is greater 
than 0.1, they define the sector as “traded”.  Table 1 shows the sectors which fall under the 
tradable and non-tradable category: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In addition to being protected from private demand changes, most services which fall in the public sector do 
not appear in the consumer price index.   Johnston 
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Table 1: Tradable and Non-Tradable Sectors 
 
average level of [(X+M)/2]/VA  
Industry 
over the period 1990-1997 (in%) 
Type of Industry 
according to the 
10% criterion 
Agricultural, forestry and fishery 
products  34.5  T 
Agricultural and food industries  81.2  T 
Energy  57.1  T 
Intermediate goods  115  T 
Producer durables  108.1  T 
Consumer durables  151.6  T 
Automotive vehicles and other land 
transport equipment  158.7  T 
Consumer and non-durables  80  T 
Products of building and construction, 
civil and rural engineering  0  N 
Wholesale and retail trade  0  N 
Transport and telecommunications 
services  12.3  T 
Market services (business activities 
and hotels and restaurants)  7.4  N 
Insurance services  7.4  N 
Services of financial institutions  21.8  T 
Non market services  0  N 
                                                                                                             Source: Allard-Prigent et al. (2000) 
 
 
The table above offers several possible proxies to use as the private, sheltered sector.  For the 
sake of simplicity, only two of the above sectors will be selected for the sheltered, private-
sector  composite:  wholesale  and  retail  trade  and  market  services.    The  private,  sheltered 
services sector used for this analysis is a weighted composite of wholesale and retail trade 
(ISIC tabulation category G), hotels and restaurants (ISIC tabulation category H) and real-
estate, renting and business activities (ISIC tabulation category K)
11.  Manufacturing (ISIC 
tabulation category D) is used as a proxy for the highly exposed sector.  Both proxy sectors 
represent approximately 40% to 50% of total employment for all 15 countries examined.   
The calculation of wage restraint used stems from Oliver Blanchard’s efficiency wage 
measurement (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000;  Blanchard 2006).   Blanchard measures  wage 
restraint as real wage growth minus labour’s share in total factor productivity growth.  If wage 
                                                 
11 Weighting is based upon employment share in the total economy.   Johnston 
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restraint is absent, this value will be highly positive; if it is present, this value will be near 
zero or negative.  Blanchard uses labour’s share in total factor productivity (TFP) to capture 
labour’s contribution to productivity increases in an economy.  Labour’s share in TFP is not 
available  on  a  sectoral  basis.    Therefore,  this  paper  will  use  gross-value  added  per  hour 
worked  for  labour  productivity.    While  the  lack  of  availability  of  such  productivity  data 
limited  Garrett  and  Way’s  analysis,  which  is  why  they  resorted  to  inflation  rather  than 
sectoral wage restraint, EU KLEMS database provides wage and productivity data by ISIC 
sector classification.  Finally, since bargaining rounds within many of the countries examined 
straddle years, three year moving averages of sectoral wage restraint, rather than year-on-year 
changes will be examined.     
Because the performance of sectoral wage restraint within countries will be compared, 
using nominal wage growth instead of real wage growth is not important - all four sectors 
within a country experience the same inflation rate.   Nominal wage restraint between sectors 
within countries will be the main focus of analysis.  Nominal wage per hour is calculated by 
dividing total compensation of employees by total hours worked (COMP/H_EMPE).  Sectoral 
gross value added per hour worked (LP_I) is used for labour productivity.          
Sigma  and  beta  convergence  are  the  most  common  approaches  in  analysing 
divergence.  These approaches are often used to analyse convergence or divergence among 
many units, yet they also can be used to assess divergence between as few as three or two.  
Sigma  convergence  analysis  of  sectoral  wage  restraint  within  EMU  countries  provides 
relatively the same picture as the one presented above when only wage inflation differentials 
were  examined.    Average  standard  deviations  between  3  year  moving  averages  of  wage 
inflation in the highly exposed, manufacturing and the relatively sheltered, private services 
sectors were quite low within EMU10 countries during the mid to late-1980s.  The early 
1990s witnessed an even further decrease in standard deviations of wage restraint between Johnston 
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these two sectors within EMU countries, yet around the mid to late 1990s, standard deviations 
began to climb (see Figures 2 and 3).   
Figure 2: Sectoral Nominal Wage Restraint Performance (Unweighted Average for EMU10) 
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                             Source Data from EU KLEMS Database 
 
 
Figure 3: Sigma Convergence in EMU10’s Average Nominal Wage Restraint between the 
Manufacturing and Sheltered, Private Services Sectors 
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Sigma convergence is helpful in understanding convergence/divergence over time; it 
does  not,  however,  indicate  whether  such  convergence  or  divergence  is  accompanied  by 
greater  coordination  of  wage  restraint,  either  voluntary  or  forced,  between  sectoral  wage 
actors.    Combining  standard  deviation  analysis  with  a  methodology  that  assesses 
synchronicity of wage restraint cycles between sectors, therefore, is helpful in understanding 
whether  wage  restraint  between  sectors  was  more  or  less  synchronous  under  a  common 
external pressure: an exchange-rate-peg-enforcing national central bank.  One method that has 
been used to assess synchronicity is pair-wise correlation analysis.  Correlation analysis has 
been heavily used in business cycle convergence analysis (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992; 
Artis & Zhang 1997; Artis, 2008) as well as in wage growth cycle analysis (Pichelmann, 
2001).   
Using  cross-correlation  analysis  for  examining  wage  restraint  cycles  has  several 
advantages. One is that, since it is a measurement of synchronicity between two functions, 
and not of causation, it does not require control checks, which would be severely limited in 
this case due to degrees of freedom problems; because  sectoral divergence is assessed only 
within countries, rather than between them, for such short periods of time.  Secondly, cross-
correlation analysis can be conducted on time series with as few as seven observations.
12  
Thirdly, if cross-correlation analysis is conducted for separate time periods, it can be more 
helpful than a panel regression analysis in locating institutional trend breaks for countries that 
witness a similar institutional change.  Regression analysis is unhelpful when institutional 
variables  take  identical,  binary  values  for  the  majority  of  the  panel  across  time;  the 
determination  of  significant  results  requires  some  degree  of  variation.    Cross-correlation 
analysis can be used to side-step this caveat by comparing the synchronisation of variables in 
one time period where the institutional variable was absent to another time period where the 
                                                 
12  I thank Michael Artis for this point. 
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institutional variable was present.  However, one downside to cross-correlation analysis is that 
it does not prove causation, but rather provides evidence for correlation.  Thus, results have to 
be interpreted carefully.                 
Pair-wise  correlations  were  calculated  for  three-year  moving  averages  in  wage 
restraint between the exposed and sheltered sectors within each EMU10, and for each non-
EMU5 country for control purposes, for three periods: 1979-1989 (the early ERM period), 
1992-1998 (the Maastricht period), and 1999-2005 (the EMU period).  For each period, a 
pair-wise correlation coefficient is calculated between wage restraint cycles for a country’s 
exposed, manufacturing sector and sheltered, private services sector.  The coefficients for 
each country, for all three periods, is reported in Table 2.  Given national central banks’ 
commitment  to  uphold  exchange  rate  peg  arrangements  in  the  1980s  and  the  Maastricht 
criteria in the 1990s, it is expected that pair-wise coefficients between the private sector and 
the manufacturing sector would be higher for EMU countries in the 1979-1989 and the 1992-
1998 periods than in the EMU period.  Moreover, given that central banks in Australia, Japan, 
the US and to some degree Sweden and the UK, were not under strict obligation to comply 
with fixed exchange rate arrangements like the EMU10, pair-wise coefficients between the 
private services sectors and the manufacturing sector should be higher for EMU-countries, 
compared  to  the  non-EMU5  countries,  for  the  1992-1998  period,  when  the  most  strict 
monetary constraint was placed on private services via the Maastricht inflation criteria, and 
possibly the 1979-1989 period.  
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III. The 1980s and Maastricht: The Golden Age of Sectoral Wage Coordination  
In the 1980s, most EMU candidate  countries belonged to the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
either  formally  or  informally.
13    As  a  consequence  of  pegging  their  currencies  to  the 
Deutschmark, shadowing national banks became less accommodating to national wage setters 
and  more  concerned  with  maintaining  stable  exchange  rates.    Under  the  ERM’s  fixed 
exchange  rate  regime,  national  central  banks  of  EMU  candidate  countries  were  forced  to 
shadow the Bundesbank’s interest rate policy in order to avoid their currencies sliding against 
the  Deutschmark.    If  a  country’s  inflation  rate  was  significantly  higher  than  the  German 
inflation rate, threatening the peg, central banks would be forced to intervene via monetary 
tightening.  Though 1979-1983 was a period marked by multiple currency realignments, the 
frequency of these alignments slowed after this time; between January, 1987 and September, 
1992 there were no realignments at all (McNamara, 1998: 159-160).       
  The ERM’s fixed exchange rate regime left wage setters in high-inflation, shadowing 
countries with two options for avoiding such monetary tightening.  One option was that wage 
setters in all sectors could cooperate in exerting wage restraint, placing downward pressures 
on labour costs, and ultimately inflation.  The second option was that wage setters in one 
(generally exposed) sector could exert significant wage restraint in order to offset wage excess 
in other (generally sheltered) sectors.  The first option appears to be undertaken by national 
wage setters within the EMU10 during the 1980s.  Nominal wage excess was high in all 
sectors, and it was unlikely that wage setters in the manufacturing sector would be able or 
willing to significantly deflate their wages in order to accommodate higher wage increases in 
                                                 
13 While Austria and Finland were not formal members of the EU, they had established currency pegs with the 
Deutschmark during the 1970s and 1980s.  Austria established direct a hard currency peg policy with Germany 
in 1974 (Hochreiter & Winckler, 1995).  During the 1980s, Finland had anchored the markka to a basket of 
(weighted)  currencies,  which  included  the  Deutschmark,  and  the  currency  remained  in  a  strict  4.5%  band 
between 1982 to 1988. The marrka was pegged to the ECU in 1991, but this was abandoned in September, 1992.  
The marrka rejoined the ERM in 1996 until Euro entry (Honkapohja & Koskela, 1999). 
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the sheltered, private services sectors.  In response to monetary pressures placed upon them 
under the ERM, wage restraint in all sectors significantly increased (see Figure 2).   
During  the  1980s,  sectoral  wage  restraint  cycles  were  highly  synchronised  within 
EMU countries, due the fact that wage setters in all sectors improved their wage restraint 
performances.    In  1979,  nominal  wage  growth  significantly  exceeded  labour  productivity 
growth for all four sectors in all EMU candidate countries.  Strict exchange rate arrangements 
forced wage setters within these sectors to close the gap between nominal wage and labour 
productivity growth.  Because all wage setters were pursuing similar policies of wage restraint 
during  the  1980s,  wage  restraint  cycles  became  highly  synchronised  between  the 
manufacturing and private services sectors (Table 2).  Seven of the EMU10 had pair-wise 
correlation  coefficients  between  wage  restraint  in  the  manufacturing  and  private  services 
sectors that exceeded 0.7 (out of 1), and the EMU10 average for this period was 0.75.  The 
non-EMU5 countries had slightly lower levels of wage restraint synchronisation between the 
manufacturing and private services sector, yet average pair-wise correlations were 0.64, not 
significantly different from that of the EMU10.   
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Table 2: Sectoral Nominal Wage Restraint Correlations between the Manufacturing and 
Sheltered, Private Services Sectors 
 
  1979-1989  1992-1998  1999-2005 
 
Austria  0.37 
(0.264) 
0.97** 
(0.000) 
-0.77** 
(0.041) 
Belgium  0.40   
(0.224) 
0.72* 
(0.070) 
0.09 
(0.854) 
Finland  0.93***  
(0.000) 
0.19  
(0.678) 
-0.57 
(0.179) 
France  0.98*** 
(0.000) 
0.59  
(0.163) 
0.88*** 
(0.008) 
Germany  0.77*** 
(0.005) 
0.81**  
(0.028) 
0.46 
(0.298) 
Ireland  0.94***  
(0.000) 
0.93*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.23 
(0.627) 
Italy  0.97***  
(0.000) 
0.94***  
(0.002) 
0.71* 
(0.073) 
Netherlands  0.75***  
(0.008) 
0.75*  
(0.051) 
0.61  
(0.143) 
Portugal  0.48 
(0.137) 
0.97*** 
(0.000) 
0.85** 
(0.015) 
Spain  0.93*** 
(0.000) 
0.98*** 
(0.000) 
-0.45 
(0.313) 
EMU AVERAGE 
 
0.75  0.78  0.16 
Australia 
 
0.58* 
(0.063) 
-0.19 
(0.683) 
-0.66 
(0.106) 
Japan 
 
0.89*** 
(0.000) 
0.65 
(0.115) 
0.56 
(0.187) 
Sweden  -0.15 
(0.662) 
0.92*** 
(0.003) 
0.69* 
(0.089) 
UK 
 
0.89**  
(0.014) 
0.80** 
(0.033) 
0.78** 
(0.040) 
USA 
 
0.97*** 
(0.000) 
-0.58 
(0.174) 
-0.73* 
(0.064) 
NON-EMU 
AVERAGE 
0.64  0.32  0.13 
Source Data from EU KLEMS Database. The table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients for 3-year moving averages in 
wage restraint between the manufacturing and sheltered, private services sectors.  
P-values in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
        
After the ERM crisis in 1992, the gap between nominal wage and labour productivity 
growth was significantly lower than the gap that had existed in the 1980s, and sheltered sector 
wage growth had been reined in substantially.  ERM’s bands were expanded to ±15% of the 
target rate in order to accommodate speculation against currencies, particularly the franc and Johnston 
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the lira.  Though this move may have prompted wage setters, especially in sheltered sectors, 
to  relax  wage  restraint,  Maastricht’s  inflation  criteria  gave  central  banks  in  candidate 
countries further ability to force wage restraint upon them.  In order to qualify for EMU 
membership,  it  was  established  that  all  candidate  countries  would  not  only  have  to  fulfil 
ERM’s looser band requirements, but would also have to maintain an inflation rate that was 
no higher than 1.5% of the EU’s three lowest inflation members (McNamara, 1998: 164).  
Because Germany’s inflation was among the lowest in the EU, the Deutschmark effectively 
became a second nominal anchor, not only for exchange rates but also for inflation.  Through 
this criterion, central banks maintained their monetary tightness on wage setters and wage 
restraint in all four sectors continued.  As inflation was a direct requirement to enter EMU, 
wage setters in the sheltered, private services sector had to be particularly cautious in its their 
wage demands. 
     Compared to the 1980s, the Maastricht period (1992-1998) still boasted a highly 
synchronous regime for the EMU10; wage restraint cycles between the manufacturing sector 
and private services sector remained highly synchronous.  During the Maastricht period, eight 
out of ten countries experienced correlation coefficients higher than 0.7.  The deterioration of 
some EMU countries’ correlation values, notably Finland’s, can be attributed to their more 
lengthy exit from the ERM during this period.  The Finnish marrka was pegged to the ECU in 
1991, but the ERM crisis, coupled with a deep recession, forced the Finnish central bank to 
abandon this peg in September of 1992.  The marrka stayed out of the ERM until 1996, when 
Finland committed itself to EMU membership.  
The experience of the non-EMU5 during the Maastricht period (1992-1998) provides 
a  stark  contrast  to  that  of  the  EMU10.    Unlike  in  the  1980s  where  average  pair-wise 
correlations between the manufacturing and private services sectors were relatively similar for 
the two groups of countries, there were significant differences in performance between these Johnston 
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two groups for the Maastricht period.   Average pair-wise correlations for the non-EMU5 
plummeted to half of its 1980s value, while they slightly increased for the EMU10.  Strict 
inflation criteria, and the central bank’s commitment to fulfilling them in order to help their 
countries obtain EMU entry, was highly conducive to dampening wage excess pressures in 
the private, sheltered sector.  Wage setters in these sectors were heavily constrained in their 
wage demands, for under Maastricht, inflationary wage settlements would not only threaten 
an exchange rate peg (whose bands were quite loose) but more importantly would threaten 
entry into EMU itself. 
  Yet despite the even more urgent constraints upon sheltered sector wage setters to 
maintain  wage  moderation,  by  1996  a  split  emerged  between  sectoral  wage  restraint 
performances across the EMU10.  Wage setters in the manufacturing sector continued to rein 
in  wage  excess,  and  wage  restraint  performance  continued  to  improve.    However,  wage 
restraint performance in the sheltered, private sectors stagnated, and after 1999 increased.  In 
the final two years of the ERM, the second option available to national wage setters to avoid 
monetary  tightening  –  having  one  sector  continue  to  exert  wage  restraint  in  order  to 
accommodate wage excess in others – was taken, setting the stage for sectoral divergence.  
 
IV.  EMU and the Rise of Sectoral Divergence 
EMU produced one substantial shift in wage setters; it removed the strict (national) 
monetary regime that governed wage setting since the 1980s and prompted the heavy exertion 
of wage restraint by wage setters in all sectors.  Indeed, the new monetary regime under EMU 
was  intended  to  be  just  as  strict  as  before.    The  ECB  was  modelled  on  the  German 
Bundesbank, and price stability, keeping EMU aggregate inflation around 2%, was the only 
mandate that it had to fulfil.  However, there was one major difference between this new 
regime and the one in place under the ERM: monetary strictness was no longer imposed upon Johnston 
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wage setters at the national level, but rather was enforced at the supranational level.  National 
central banks no longer had inflation criteria to enforce or exchange rate arrangements to 
uphold.  While these central banks may have cared a great deal if national wage inflation was 
excessive prior to 1999, the ECB had little concern with wage inflation developments at the 
national level unless they impacted EMU’s aggregate inflation rate.      
  The shift from national central banks to the ECB led many political science scholars to 
conclude that EMU would prompt a decline in aggregate wage restraint across all member-
states (Hall 1994; Hall & Franzese 1998; Iversen & Soskice 1998; Soskice & Iversen 2000; 
Cukierman and Lippi 2001; Hancké & Soskice, 2003).  Contrary to these projections, national 
wages remained moderate in many EMU countries, and aggregate wage excess was by no 
means  high  compared  to  the  1980s  period,  though  there  were  some  national  exceptions 
(notably the Netherlands and Ireland).   
Performance at the national level, however, masked developments at the sectoral level.  
Preferences  for  wage  moderation  were  very  different  across  sectors  and  this  preference 
divergence  led,  in  some  countries,  to  significant  divergence  in  sectoral  wage  inflation 
outcomes.  For wage bargainers in the exposed sector, preferences to exert wage moderation 
were still high under EMU.  Should wage setters in the exposed sector push for excess wage 
growth, firms in the export sector would either lose competitiveness, if wage increases were 
passed onto prices, or would cut employment.  A strict competitiveness constraint ensured 
that wage moderation would continue in these sectors, as unions feared that a drop in price 
competitiveness would be followed by a parallel drop in employment.  In all of the EMU10 
countries, with the exception of Italy and Portugal, wage restraint in the manufacturing sector 
continued to increase after 1999. 
Preferences for wage moderation due to a competitiveness constraint do not exist for 
the  sheltered  sectors.    With  the  removal  of  the  hard,  national  monetary  constraint  by Johnston 
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introduction  of  the  ECB  in  1999  –  and  manufacturing’s  uptake  of  a  deflationary  role  in 
1996/7 across most countries – unions in sheltered sectors are, in principle, free to press for 
inflationary wage settlements.  This preference divergence, that was allowed to manifest in 
the  absence  of  hard  monetary  criteria  and  exchange  rate  arrangements  in  1999,  would 
translate into a sharp divergence between  wage rates in the exposed (manufacturing) and 
sheltered  (private  services)  sectors.    Data  in  Table  2  provide  evidence  that  supports  this.  
Presenting pair-wise correlation coefficients for an identical length of time to the Maastricht 
period,  7  years,  correlation  coefficients  between  wage  restraint  cycles  in  the  (exposed) 
manufacturing  and  (sheltered)  private  services  sector  collapsed  for  most  countries  under 
EMU.  Of the ten pair-wise correlations between wage restraint in the manufacturing and 
private  services  sector,  only  three  countries  (France,  Italy,  and  Portugal)  have  correlation 
coefficients higher than 0.7.  In the final two cases, the stability of the coefficient in the EMU 
period  can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  manufacturing  sector,  along  with  the  private 
services sectors, pursued excessive wage increases after 1999.   
The  experiences  of  the  non-EMU5  provide  important  benchmarks  for  EMU 
performance.  Manufacturing and sheltered, private services pair-wise correlation averages for 
the  EMU10  and  non-ERM/EMU5  nearly  equalised  under  the  EMU  period,  although  it  is 
important to note, that since pair-wise correlation coefficients are so low, difference of means 
tests yield inconclusive results.  Due to the removal of the ERM’s and Maastricht’s intricate 
exchange rate regime, the EMU10 lost an important disciplining agent – a national central 
bank – which had the ability to impose wage restraint on sheltered sector wage setters that 
were large enough to affect the national inflation rate.  Under EMU, these wage actors were 
no longer large enough to attract the attention of the new supranational central bank, and they 
were granted greater manoeuvring room to implement their wage preferences.   Johnston 
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To  conclude,  divergence  in  sectoral  wage  restraint  within  EMU  results  from  two 
components:  competitiveness-driven  restraint  in  the  exposed  sector,  and  wage  increases 
beyond productivity in the sheltered sector.  Both of these components become increasingly 
manifest in the absence of a national monetary authority that prefers to keep either a stable 
exchange rate or low national inflation.  Low levels of wage inflation in the sheltered sector 
can be relatively easily compensated by productivity gains in the exposed sector, thus re-
balancing the aggregate level of wage restraint between these two sectors in an economy.  
Higher levels of wage inflation are more problematic, as they impose disinflation or a less 
competitive real exchange rate on the exposed sector. The exact mix between the two sectoral 
inflation  rates  is  determined  by  the  relative  power  of  wage-setters  in  the  exposed  and 
sheltered  sector  and  by  the  extent  to  which  the  leadership  role  of  the  exposed  sector  is 
institutionalised in wage bargaining systems. 
 
V.  Conclusions: Implications of Sectoral divergence for EMU? 
Evidence  provided  here  has  challenged  previous  theory  on  sectoral  wage  preference 
divergence.  The correlation results provided in this paper offers some evidence that a national 
monetarist  constraint  can  suppress  inter-sectoral  preference  divergence  within  countries, 
leading to convergence in sectoral wage restraint outcomes.  The ERM and EMU regimes 
present convenient settings to examine the impact of national central banks and exchange rate 
arrangements on sectoral wage divergence.  The pre-EMU regime, defined by fixed exchange 
rate arrangements with the Deutschmark, imposed hard monetary rules upon all wage setters, 
forcing unions in both the exposed and sheltered sectors to exert wage restraint.  Differences 
between sectoral wage restraint within countries, therefore, remained very low for the EMU10 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Monetary union’s removal of these rules has produced very 
different outcomes for wage setters within countries.  For the exposed sector, monetary union Johnston 
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has  not  changed  much;  competitiveness  still  constrains  wage  growth  via  the  threat  that 
excessive wage settlements will lead to parallel drops in unemployment.  The same cannot be 
said of sheltered sector wage setters.  
  The rise in sectoral wage-restraint divergence under EMU lends credence to Crouch’s 
and Garrett and Way’s hypotheses.  However, since 1999, there has been wide variation in the 
level of divergence between sectors within EMU countries.  Private sector wage setters in 
some countries (Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) have been much more successful 
in obtaining higher wage increases under EMU than in others (Austria, France, and Germany 
in particular).  Though the degree of variation in sectoral wage-restraint divergence since 
1996/7 for the EMU10 is beyond the scope of this paper, it does refer back to the original 
debate put forth by Crouch and Garrett and Way, who attributed sheltered sector wage excess 
to larger, more powerful sheltered sector unions.  Much has changed since these two analysis.  
Several countries in both authors’ studies (Austria and Germany most notably) witnessed the 
creation of large, encompassing service sector unions due to union mergers in the early 2000s.  
Yet for Austria and Germany, public sector wage growth still remains greatly subdued.  That 
these countries continue to have higher rates of wage restraint in their private services sectors 
than other EMU10 countries with smaller private services sector unions highlights a further 
puzzle  about  the  variation  of  sectoral  divergence  across  EMU  member-states.    Further 
research  on  institutionalised  constraints  that  bind  sheltered  sector  wage  setters  (such  as 
bargaining  coordination  frameworks)  is  needed  to  better  understand  the  factors  and 
institutions that contribute to widening sectoral wage-restraint divergence.          
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